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BOOK REVIEW
ENHANCING THE LEARNING EXPERIENCE WITH
CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFS NOTES
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ORAL
ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT SINCE 1955, Peter
Irons and Stephanie Guitton Eds., The New Press (1993).
375 pp.
David Frey*
The initial study of constitutional law can be either one of
the more vibrant intellectual pursuits upon entering law
school, or one of the most tediously boring exercises imagin-
able. At times, it involves immersing one's self in philosophical
debates which impact on most aspects of modern life. At other
times, it seems to involve merely reading judicial opinions that
are the literary equivalent of a mouth full of sand. Which of
these two extremes describes one's opinion often depends on
how a professor presented the cases, or how the cases were
presented in a textbook.
A significant step towards making constitutional jurispru-
dence come alive for all is May It Please the Court, a set of six
audio tapes and an accompanying book and transcript which
present some of the most famous arguments before the United
' Associate, STEVEN FREY, P.C. J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 1993; M.B.A.,
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1989; B.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1988.
I wish to thank Traci B. Frey and Professor Sarah Robbins for their assistance in
preparing this Book Review. I also wish to thank Professors Joel Gora and Nan
Hunter for making constitutional law classes something to which I could look
forward.
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States Supreme Court in the last thirty-five years. The narra-
tions and oral arguments were edited by Professor Peter Irons,
a professor of political science at the University of California at
San Diego. The Court opinions and case bibliographies were
edited and compiled by Stephanie Guitton, who holds a law
degree from the University of Poitiers in France and, at time of
publication, was a doctoral candidate at the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley.
Much has already been written about the controversial
genesis of this book.' After reading the book and listening to
the tapes, one has to wonder, "Why?" Nathaniel Hawthorne, in
the preface to Twice-Told Tales, stated that "[t]he book, if you
would see anything in it, requires to be read in the clear,
brown, twilight atmosphere in which it was written; if opened
in the sunshine, it is apt to look exceedingly like a volume of
blank pages." But one hopes that this is not true of the Su-
preme Court's decisions. And, after reading the book and lis-
tening to the tapes, the Court's desire to limit access to the
tapes is baffling. The tapes lend a touch of humanity to the
Court and reveal a different dimension of constitutional juris-
prudence. Moreover, as a matter of pure legal scholarship, May
It Please the Court cannot be categorized as The Brethren, Part
Il. Instead, the work is intended to enhance the study of con-
stitutional law by law students, legal scholars and members of
the bar who may argue before the Court. In this context, the
book easily accomplishes its goal.
May It Please the Court begins with an excellent overview
of Supreme Court jurisdiction and process, which in many
respects mirrors the introduction to a first-year law student's
constitutional law course. The work touches on major cases in
five areas of constitutional law: governmental powers, the First
Amendment, criminal procedure, equal protection under the
1 The tapes are kept in the National Archives and the Supreme Court allows
use of these tapes only for private research and teaching purposes. Moreover,
before gaining access to them, one must sign a "use restriction" contract indicating
that no commercial use will be made of the tapes. Peter Irons, one of the editors
of this book, signed this contract, but has since insisted that the contract is an
invalid prior restraint on public materials. See James H. Andrews, Tapes of Oral
Argument May Cause Supreme Suit, CHRISTIAN ScI. MON., Oct. 7, 1993, at 2;
Maro Robbins, "May It Please the Court" Doesn't Please the Court, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
11, 1993, at 47.
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Fourteenth Amendment and privacy rights. Each of these five
sections is introduced by a short summary of the historical and
legal framework in which the cases arose. More specifically
each case is preceded by a brief summary, including a short
historical perspective, the facts of the case, the decision and
the legal and historical aftermath. Following this introduction
is a transcript of the oral argument, accompanied by a
narrator's commentary. The narrator introduces the various
players, including their argument style and strategy. After the
edited oral argument, the narrator summarizes the decision(s)
and the legal and historical aftermath of the Court's opinion.
Finally, edited versions of the opinions are reproduced.
The audio tapes are timed and indexed so that finding
specific arguments is easy. The quality of these tapes varies
depending on the year the case was argued. It is somewhat
unfortunate that the publisher did not employ modern technol-
ogy to clear up the fuzzy quality of many of the tapes. And,
parenthetically, the editors might well have dispensed with the
amateurish synthesizer music at the beginning of each tape.2
Some introductions to particular sections are more successful
than others, which might have to do with the cases chosen by
the editors. The first three cases, Baker v. Carr,3 United States
v. Nixon,4 and DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services5 are grouped under the somewhat amorphous
heading "Secure the Blessings of Liberty."6 The explanation of
how these particular cases are connected seems a bit strained.
The authors posit that they put the Constitution to its "hardest
test" by forcing the Court to balance governmental power
against the rights of the people. This explanation is a bit over-
stated, especially when such cases as Griswold v. Connecticut7
2 Indeed, every time I started listening to the new side of a tape I half ex-
pected acrobats, clowns and circus dogs to start scampering through the room.
3 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (equal protection/voter apportionment); MAY IT PLEASE
THE COURT 7 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton, eds., 1993).
4 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (presidential immunity); MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT,
supra note 3, at 23.
489 U.S. 189 (1989) (Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of liberty/due pro-
cess); MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 39.
6 See MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 3.
7 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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and Brown v. Board of Education' are missing, and when Roe
v. Wade9 appears in another section.1
Similarly, the grouping of the cases within the sections are
not always perfect. For instance, there is an interesting com-
ment by the editors" that Chief Justice Warren's opinion in
Terry v. Ohio," a case that explored the Fourth Amendment
limitations on the police practice of the "stop-and-frisk," per-
haps was influenced by criticism that he was soft on crime in
light of his opinion in Miranda v. Arizona." The insight of
that comment, however, is weakened by the fact that the
Miranda case, which was decided before Terry, is reproduced
after the Terry opinion. Another example of questionable case
grouping is Loving v. Virginia," which is contained in the
equal protection section.15 The arguments which prevailed for
the Lovings would provide an interesting contrast to Bowers v.
Hardwick,"6 where similar arguments also could have been
made for Michael Hardwick, whose case appears in the Privacy
Rights section eighty-four pages later.17 Of course, these are
minor structural criticisms; indeed, the complexity of the con-
stitutional issues in Equal Protection and privacy seem to
make discerning bright-line distinctions difficult not only for
editors of textbooks, but often for America's nine highest ju-
rists as well.
What May It Please the Court does especially well is show
the reader how oral arguments are presented to the Court, and
what the Court does with those arguments. Before each argu-
ment, the editors' summary of the case includes which side
prevailed. In close cases, I found myself reading the transcript
and listening to the tapes to spot the flaw, if any, that may
have led to victory or defeat. The first case presented, Baker v.
8 347 U.S. 483 (1954); MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 247.
410 U.S. 113 (1973); MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 343.
10 See MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 5.
1' Id. at 207.
12 392 U.S. 1 (1968); MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 199.
13 384 U.S. 436 (1966); MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 213.
14 388 U.S. 1 (1967); MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 277.
1 MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 245.
16 478 U.S. 186 (1986); MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 361.
17 MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 339.
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Carr," is a perfect example of how "20/20 hindsight" affects
the reader. The transcript of the oral argument of Jack Wilson,
who represented the State of Tennessee, serves as an example
of how one should not present their case to the court. One
wonders if, perhaps, Mr. Wilson was being paid like a modern-
day Dickens-not necessarily for the content of his argument,
but for the number of times he could repeat the phrase "may it
please the court." Listening to Mr. Wilson on the audiotape is
even more illuminating. His voice is arrogant and patronizing,
something one would not glean from reading only the tran-
script.
Another example of an attorney unnecessarily antagoniz-
ing the Court is contained in Cooper v. Aaron,9 where Rich-
ard Butler, representing a Little Rock school board that re-
fused to obey Supreme Court edicts on racial integration, en-
gaged in the following exchange with the Court:
Butler: The point I'm making is this: that if the governor of any
state says that a United States Supreme Court decision is not the
law of the land, the people of that state, until it is really resolved,
have a doubt in their mind and a right to have a doubt.
Warren: I have never heard such an argument made in a court of
justice before, and I've tried many a case, over many a year. I never
heard a lawyer say that the statement of a governor, as to what was
legal or illegal, should control the action of any court.2"
Of course, the argument of the NAACP's attorney, Thurgood
Marshall, won the day, and the Court ordered the Little Rock
school board to integrate its schools.2'
Another of the fascinating exercises prompted by May It
Please the Court is spotting the Justices who have already
made up their minds before oral argument even begins. Perfect
examples are Edwards v. Aguillard2 and DeShaney v.
Winnebago Department of Social Services,' in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist seemed to tip his hand. In Edwards, which
,' 369 U.S. 186 (1982); MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 7.
1 358 U.S. 1 (1958); MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 249.
20 MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 253.
21 An interesting historical sidenote the editors provide is that, rather than
obey the Court's decision, the school board closed the schools for over a year, until
they were voted out of office. Id- at 256-57.
2 482 U.S. 578 (1987); MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 75.
23 489 U.S. 189 (1989); MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 39.
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dealt with a 1982 Louisiana law requiring a "balanced treat-
ment" of "evolution science" and "creative science" in biology
courses, the following colloquy occurred:
Topkis: All right. Now, I said before that this definition that Mr.
Bird is so fond of, and I quote it- "origin through abrupt appear-
ance in complex form of biological life, life itself, and the physical
universe" -- one thing we know about that collection of words is that
it has never before been seen upon the face of the earth except in
Mr. Bird's briefs .... Mr. Bird is a little slender to play
Tweedledum, but that's what he's trying to do. He wants words to
mean what he says they mean. That didn't fool Alice, and I doubt
very much that it will fool this Court.
Rehnquist: Don't overestimate us. (laughter)24
The Court eventually ruled 7-2 against Louisiana's law. One of
the two dissenters was Chief Justice Rehnquist." Similarly
illustrative is DeShaney v. Winnebago County:
Court [Rehnquist]: And under your theory, I take it, if two policemen
see a rape and watch it just for their own amusement, no violation
of the Constitution?
Mingo: We would concede that there is no constitutional violation in
that particular case.
Court: You're arguing it as well as conceding it. (laughter)6
Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to write the majority opinion,
which supported the view expressed in his hypothetical ques-
tion.27
An equally fascinating aspect of the audio tapes is hearing
the timbre of the different justices' voices. For instance, Justice
Frankfurter's inflections are those of a careful man who must
have worn a bow tie. The timbre of Justice Thurgood
Marshall's voice, especially in his later years, reflects the
struggles as a black attorney pushing the boundaries of a rac-
ist society throughout his personal and professional life. A real
shock, however, was Justice O'Connor's voice, which I found to
be surprisingly serene, and which must have the effect of calm-
ing attorneys arguing before the Court.
Another strong point of May It Please the Court is the
24 MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 84 (Narrator's comments delet-
ed).
21 Id. at 85-86.
26 Id. at 46-47.
27 Id. at 48.
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historical perspective it adds to the cases, and the fine editing
of some of the more verbose opinions. Any student of constitu-
tional law who was called on to recite the facts of United
States v. Nixon" will appreciate that the editors have man-
aged to reduce Chief Justice Burger's stultifying recitation of
the history of the case into two, short understandable para-
graphs. Moreover, the following summary really brings the
case to life:
The Court had decided. But would the president obey? Nixon explod-
ed and threatened defiance of the Court's order. But it was too late.
Three days later, the House Judiciary Committee voted to impeath
the president for obstruction of justice. James St. Clair [the
president's counsel] finally listened to Watergate tapes and discov-
ered the "smoking gun," Nixon's personal Watergate cover-up order.
His impeachment became a certainty. On August 8, 1974, Richard
Nixon dictated an eleven-word letter: "I hereby resign the Office of
President of the United States." The next day, he left the White
House for the last time.29
Throughout the book and in the narration of the tapes, the
editor's liberal bent is evident. It is no mistake that the book is
dedicated to Justices Brennan and Marshall "with gratitude
and admiration for helping to preserve our constitution as a
living document that protects the rights and dignity of every
American." Therefore, the editors' use of death penalty statis-
tics since Gregg v. Georgia30 to persuade the listener that the
Court's decision was incorrect is not surprising. Indeed, the
editors' historical wrap-up and use of numbers is more persua-
sive than some of the oral argument presented to the Court in
Gregg:
[Brennan and Marshall's] retirements in 1990 and '91 removed the
only voices and votes against capital punishment from the Supreme
Court. Since the Gregg decision, more than twenty-five hundred
defendants have been sentenced to death. Most are poor, half are
black, many are retarded, and some are juveniles. Critics have
charged that the Court is insensitive to these factors. But the Court
has rejected claims that poor defendants have a right to good law-
2 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
21 MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 33. Another of the strong sum-
maries is found in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), a case upholding
Georgia's guidelines for juries asked to impose the death penalty. See MAY IT
PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 229.
"' 428 U.S. at 153; MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 229.
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yers and that southern white juries are biased against blacks. And
the Court has approved the execution of mentally retarded and
juvenile defendants.
No country has more prisoners awaiting execution than the United
States. Capital punishment has increased in frequency and contro-
versy since the Supreme Court decided that the death penalty does
not offend the Constitution.3
The most powerful aspect of May It Please the Court is the
oral arguments that were made for and against civil rights and
affirmative action laws. The best, and most volatile, example
occurs in Regents of the University of California. v. Bakke."
This case is fascinating on at least two levels.
First-arguments made by Bakke's counsel-the difference
between "goals" and "quotas" continue to be vigorously debated
by today's intelligentsia." Second, Justice Marshall's reaction
to the argument against set-asides is significant:
Narrator: Justice Thurgood Marshall asked whether [the school]
could reserve even one place for minorities.
Marshall: So numbers are just unimportant?
Colvin: The numbers are unimportant. It is the principle of keeping
a man out because of his race that is important.
Marshall: You're arguing about keeping somebody out, and the other
side is arguing about getting somebody in.
Colvin: That's right.
Marshall: So it depends on which way you look at it, doesn't it?
Colvin: It depends on which way you look at it. The problem...
(Marshall: It does?) The problem... (Marshall: It does?) If I may
finish ... (Marshall: It does?) The problem, the problem is...
Marshall: You're talking about your client's rights; don't these un-
derprivileged people have some rights?
Colvin: They certainly have the rights to compete...
Marshall: To eat cake.34
The most horrific arguments, by contrast, were those in
the interracial marriage case of Loving v. Virginia.35
Hirschkop: IT]hey wanted to preserve the racial integrity of their
citizens. They wanted not to have a "mongrel" breed of citizens. We
find there no requirement that a state shall not legislate to prevent
31 MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 238.
32 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (the affirmative action "set-aside" case); MAY IT PLEASE
THE COURT, supra note 3, at 305.
33 See, e.g., HOWARD STERN, PRiVATE PARTS 79 (1993).
34 MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 312-13.
31 347 U.S. 483 (1954); MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, supra note 3, at 277-89.
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the obliteration of racial pride but must permit the corruption of
blood even though it weaken and destroy the quality of its citizen-
ship. These are racial, and equal protection thoroughly proscribes
these.
Narrator: Hirschkop also quoted [the lower court's opinion].
Hirschkop: He says: "Almighty God created the races white, black,
yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents."
And I needn't read the whole quote, but it's a fundamentally ludi-
crous quote.3 6
The State responded:
McIlwaine: [Tihe statute before the Court in this case... covers all
the dangers which Virginia has a right to apprehend from interra-
cial marriage ....
Warren: There are people who have the same feeling about interreli-
gious marriages. But because that may be true, would you think
that the state could prohibit people from having interreligious mar-
riages?
McIlwaine: I think that the evidence in support of the prohibition of
interracial marriages is stronger than that for the prohibition of
interreligious marriages; but I think that...
Warren: How can you say that?
McIlwaine: Well, we say that principally...
Warren: Because you believe that?
Mcllwaine: No, sir. We say it principally on the basis of the authori-
ty which we have cited in our brief.
Narrator: Warren [went on to force] McIlwaine to confess that he
didn't personally believe his argument. 7
The arguments by McIlwaine and the lower court's opinion,
which rarely appear in textbooks, are a paradigm of the
strength of May It Please the Court. It is difficult to imagine
someone making this argument in a classroom today. As the
editors point out,
Racial attitudes change slowly, but they have changed with the law.
Fifty years ago, nine out of ten Americans opposed mixed marriages.
Recent polls show only one in four are still opposed, most of them
older. There are now a million interracial couples in the United
States, including Supreme Court justice Clarence Thomas and his
wife.38
But only through this sort of historical context will we under-
stand the attitudes of the day, more fully understand the Su-





preme Court opinions and hopefully learn from them.
In summary, May It Please the Court is an especially valu-
able tool for those teaching or learning constitutional law.
Classes in basic constitutional law, civil liberties and criminal
procedure are notorious for having ambitious curricula which
cannot be fully covered. They tend to either cover a large num-
ber of cases in a relatively short period of time, or skip impor-
tant cases toward the end of the semester. Accordingly, trying
to interpret Supreme Court opinions without any historical
background is a much more difficult, if not a futile, exercise.
This work solves that problem. The editors also have done an
excellent job of cutting through a lot of the superfluous lan-
guage of the oral arguments and Supreme Court opinions. May
It Please the Court could not be utilized to teach a constitution-
al law course on its own, but that is not its aim. At worst, the
work might be characterized as the equivalent of constitutional
Cliffs Notes. 9 It is a tool to enhance the learning experience
and to provide a historical, philosophical and factual back-
ground to the Court's decisionmaking process. Viewed in that
light, May It Please the Court is an important work. Perhaps it
will spur the Court to abandon its desire to become an intellec-
tual cloister.
AUTHOR'S NOTE
Between the time this Book Review was first written and
published, the Supreme Court announced that it was removing
all restrictions on the use and copying of all its oral argument
tapes. Any member of the public is now welcome to go to the
National Archives in Washington, D.C., with recording equip-
ment, or can pay $12.75 for each 1 hour tape. One publisher
has already announced that it plans to offer the Supreme
Court arguments on CD-ROM, and there is talk of making
the book into a television series on public television. Although
the Court provided no reason for lifting the restrictions, there
"' As such May It Please the Court might be helpful to at least one of the
newer justices in catching up with Supreme Court jurisprudence, as it contains an
excellent summary of Roe v. Wade.
' See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Eases Restrictions on Use of Tapes of
Its Argument, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1993, at A22.
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is little doubt that May It Please the Court was the impetus for
the justices' change of heart. Whatever the arguments as to the
quality of this book, the fact that it caused the Supreme Court
to give unprecedented access and use to its audiotape collection
marks the work as an extremely important contribution to
legal scholarship.

